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FORMALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM IN THE
ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF LOYALTY REBATES:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
DANIEL A. CRANE*
It is a widely held belief that U.S. antitrust law has long been characterized
by economic functionalism and that European antitrust law has long been
characterized by legal formalism.' The received wisdom began to change in
Europe a decade ago when the Directorate General Competition of the Euro-
pean Commission (DG Comp) began to advocate a more "effects-based" anal-
ysis of abuse of dominance. Two factors arguably contributed to this change.
First, the DG Comp became increasingly influenced by economists who had
little use for the old formalism. Second, as Europe tried to spread antitrust to
developing antitrust regimes across the world-and, in particular, to urge
these regimes to adopt an EU-style competition law-it faced pressure to re-
spond to American critics who charged that European antitrust law was too
stodgy and formalistic. Effects-based economic analysis was the sort of state-
of-the-art technocratic reasoning that could be sold as a neutral regulatory tool
irrespective of local or regional circumstances, customs, or preferences.
Exhibit A for the new European functionalism is the Commission's abrupt
change of view on loyalty rebates. In a long line of precedent, exemplified
* Associate Dean, Faculty and Research, and Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law,
University of Michigan.
I See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Direct Versus Communications-Based Prohibitions on Price Fix-
ing, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 449, 526 (2011) (asserting that U.S. law favors "economically
grounded analysis in lieu of formalistic thinking" and that this impulse has traditionally been
weaker in Europe but is now growing); William Kolasky, Reinvigorating Antitrust Enforcement
in the United States: A Proposal, ANTITRUST, Spring 2008, at 85, 86 (asserting that "the competi-
tion regime in Europe has only recently been converted from a highly bureaucratic system with
formalistic rules and procedures to a more effects-based system in which economics plays a
more central role in shaping competition policy and enforcement"); ROGER VAN DEN BERGH &
PETER CAMESASCA, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW AND EcoNoMIcs: A COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-
TIVE 1 (2d ed. 2006) ("For a long time, European competition law was permeated by legal for-
malism. [Thus,] [tihe permissibility of certain business practices was decided upon the basis of
technical legal distinctions rather than their economic effects.").
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particularly by Hoffmann-La Roche2 and Michelin,3 the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) had adopted a presumption that discounts or rebates offered by
dominant firms to induce customer loyalty were incompatible with Articles
101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
However, in a December 2008 Guidance Paper on the application of Article
102's prohibition on abuse of dominance, the Commission staff suggested
determining whether loyalty discounts are anticompetitive by using a modi-
fied predatory pricing analysis, similar to what some U.S. courts and agencies
have suggested.4 The European antitrust community has understood the Gui-
dance Paper as reflecting a movement away from a "form-based" analysis and
toward an "effects-based" or functional economic analysis.
In this essay, I shall examine the evidence that Europe has abandoned for-
malism in the analysis of loyalty rebates and has converged with American
functionalism. While this narrative is more right than wrong, it is also too
simple. As evidenced in the Commission's Intel decision6 and the General
Court decision affirming the Commission's decision,7 European treatment of
loyalty rebates retains a schizophrenic relationship with both formalism and
functionalism. And so does the United States, although with different values
and assumptions. Whereas European law is more likely to draw on formal
rules to prohibit loyalty rebates, U.S. law is more likely to draw on formal
rules to permit them. Europe employs legal formalism, and the United States
uses economic formalism. Neither system employs an open-ended rule of rea-
son type approach to loyalty rebates or is likely to do so any time soon. Both
systems employ a mixture of functional and formal considerations.
2 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Comm'n, 1979 E.C.R. 461.
3 Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Comm'n, 1983 E.C.R. 3461,
3475-86.
4 Fur. Comm'n, Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article
82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C
45) 7. The Commission's analysis was similar to that in the U.S. Justice Department's contempo-
raneous report on monopolization. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SIN-
GLE FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT § 6 (II) (2008), www.justice.gov/
atr/public/reports/236681.htm (discussing legal and economic standard for judging legality of
loyalty discounts). Three Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission criticized the Justice
Department's report as too protective of dominant firms. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n,
FTC Commissioners React to Department of Justice Report, Competition and Monopoly: Single-
Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act (Sept. 8, 2008), www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2008/09/ftc-commissioners-react-department-justice-report-competition-and. The
Obama Antitrust Division withdrew the report in one of its first official acts. Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11,
2009), www.justice.gov/atr/public/press releases/2009/2457 10.htm.
I See Neelie Kroes, Member, Fur. Comm'n in Charge of Competition Policy, Speech at the
Fordham Corporate Law Institute: Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review of Article 82, at 2
(Sept. 23, 2005) (advocating an effects-based approach to Article 82 enforcement).
6 Case COMP/C-3/37.990-Intel, Comm'n Decision (Summary), 2009 O.J. (C 227) 13.
7 Case T-286/09, Intel v. Comm'n, ECLI:EU:T:2014:547 (GC June 12, 2014).
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I. FORMALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM: SOME PRELIMINARIES
To American lawyers, inculcated through education to legal realism, for-
malism is an epithet describing a legal system where linguistically defined
rules constrict the choice of the decision maker. American lawyers often as-
sume that European civil law systems, untouched by the kind of legal realist
movement that swept through American law schools in the inter-war period,
embody a formalistic approach to jurisprudence.' In fact, the story is consider-
ably more nuanced. Many aspects of contemporary U.S. jurisprudence could
be described as formalistic as compared to their counterparts in the doctrines
of various civil law countries. U.S. jurisprudence employs a variety of ap-
proaches along the continuum of "rules versus standards," as it is often styl-
ized in jurisprudential and economic literature.10
This is true in antitrust law, as elsewhere. Contemporary U.S. antitrust ju-
risprudence is characterized by elements of both open-ended rule of reason
analysis-which invites detailed economic analysis-and more rule-bound
approaches to certain problems of market power, where analysis turns princi-
pally on the application of one or two factor liability determinants. The rule of
per se illegality for price-fixing agreements is an obvious example of a liabil-
ity determinant that approaches a single-factor rule. Once a defendant is found
to have fixed prices (an inquiry that, admittedly, sometimes requires the con-
sideration of economic factors)," the conclusion inevitably follows that the
defendant has violated the law, regardless of whether there is a good explana-
tion for the price fixing or it can be economically justified.
Academic commentators tend to view the last several decades in U.S. anti-
trust jurisprudence as moving away from this sort of rule-based approach to-
ward a more flexible, standards-based approach. The evidence for this is
primarily the courts' retreat from the per se rule and toward the rule of reason
8 Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L.J. 509 (1988); see also H.L.A. HART, THE CON-
CEPT OF LAw 124-30 (3d ed. 2012) (defining formalism as a decision maker's refusal to ac-
knowledge the necessity of choosing between results); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860, at 253-54 (1977) (defining formalism and
refusal to recognize that legal decision making serves instrumental functions); KARL N. LLEWEL-
LYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 183-88 (1962) (describing formalism
as over-reliance on canons of decision).
9 DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE) 107 (1997); Kristoffel
Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law and
Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPARATIVE L. REv. 295 (2008).
1o See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22 (1992).
11 See DANEL A. CRANE, ANTITRUST 60-62 (2014).
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on intrabrand vertical restraints,12 horizontal group boycotts,13 and tying ar-
rangements.14 But even while moving away from bright-line rules creating
liability, U.S. courts have increasingly created bright line rules insulating
from liability. In a number of contexts, mostly dominance, the courts have
created safe harbors that categorically immunize defendants from liability,
even if the relevant conduct is alleged to have reduced market competitive-
ness or harmed consumer welfare. Thus, for example, the courts have held
that defendants are categorically immune from antitrust liability for above-
cost price cuts," almost all refusals to deal,16 and bundled discounts that pass
the attribution test.1 7 These sorts of bright-line immunity zones replicate a
kind of economic formalism that had previously been seen primarily on the
liability-creating side of the ledger.
A recent example of economic formalism appears in the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Pacific Bell v. linkLine8 rejecting price squeeze (known in
Europe as margin squeeze) liability. The plaintiffs in linkLine were four inde-
pendent DSL providers who alleged that AT&T engaged in an exclusionary
"price squeeze." Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that AT&T set a high whole-
sale price to them but then a low retail price to its own customers, and that the
effect of this squeeze was that they could not profitably compete against
AT&T.19 The plaintiffs did not allege that AT&T's retail price was preda-
tory-that is to say, set below marginal cost.2 0
Although the majority opinion for five Justices also contains some institu-
tionalist analysis, the core of this opinion is formalistic. Price-squeeze claims,
12 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 908 (2007) (holding that
minimum resale price maintenance agreements were no longer per se illegal); State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997) (holding that maximum resale price maintenance agreements are no
longer per se illegal under the Sherman Act).
13 See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
14 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (jettisoning long-standing
presumption of market power where tying firm had a patent in tying market); United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting application of per se rule to technologi-
cal ties).
11 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993) (hold-
ing that a defendant cannot be liable for predatory pricing unless it prices below "an appropriate
measure of cost").
16 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)
(holding that even a monopolist has no antitrust duty to deal).
17 Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying discount attri-
bution test to allegations of anticompetitive bundled discounts).
1s Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009).
19 linkLine, 555 U.S. at 443.
20 Under U.S. predatory pricing principles, the plaintiff usually must show that the defendant
priced below some measure of incremental or marginal cost, although the Supreme Court still
has not decided exactly what measure of cost should be employed. See CRANE, supra note 11, at
110-12.
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reasoned the Court, necessarily involve defendants who operate in two mar-
kets-an upstream and a downstream market-and a plaintiff that operates in
only the downstream market. The plaintiff must buy from the defendant in the
upstream market to compete with the defendant in the downstream market.
The plaintiff alleges that the defendant misbehaved in both markets. First, the
defendant charged too high a price in the upstream market. That claim is fore-
closed by the Court's decision in Trinko,2 1 which held that even dominant
firms have no duty to share their infrastructure with rivals to facilitate compe-
tition. Since the dominant firm has no antitrust duty to deal at all in the up-
stream market, if it does choose to deal, it can charge whatever price it wants,
reasoned the Court. Second, a price-squeeze plaintiff alleges that the defen-
dant priced too low in the downstream market. But unless the plaintiff alleges
that the defendant priced below cost in the downstream market, it runs into the
Supreme Court's Brooke Group decision, which immunizes low prices from
liability unless they are below cost. The Court summed up its holding as
follows:
Plaintiffs' price-squeeze claim, looking at the relation between retail and
wholesale prices, is thus nothing more than an amalgamation of a meritless
claim at the retail level and a meritless claim at the wholesale level. If there
is no duty to deal at the wholesale level and no predatory pricing at the retail
level, then a firm is certainly not required to price both of these services in a
manner that preserves its rivals' profit margins.22
The core of the linkLine decision thus rests on the interaction of two legal
doctrines-the absence of a duty to deal and the right to price at any level
above marginal cost. The recitation of these two doctrines was sufficient to
resolve the matter, without consideration of rule of reason factors, such as
whether AT&T had market power, whether the alleged price squeeze fore-
closed competition or harmed consumer welfare, and whether AT&T could
offer any procompetitive justifications for the alleged price squeeze.
The ECJ, by contrast, has upheld liability for margin squeezes that would
likely have been categorically immunized from liability under linkLine.23 It
would be difficult to sustain an argument that he ECJ precedents on margin
squeeze reflect a greater degree of formalism than do the U.S. precedents. If
anything, it is just the opposite.
II. THE EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE OF LOYALTY REBATES
Before turning to a comparison of the functional and formal elements in the
United States' and the European Union's treatment of loyalty rebates, it would
21 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411.
22 linkLine, 555 U.S. at 452.
23 Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, 2011 E.C.R. I-527.
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be useful to provide a sketch of the doctrinal development in this area in the
past decade. Two cases that were litigated roughly in parallel on both sides of
the Atlantic-British Airways and Intel-illustrate the apparent (and perhaps
illusory) convergence that has occurred in recent years.2
The BA litigation grew out of Virgin Atlantic's entry into the trans-Atlantic
market in the mid-1980s and emergence as a serious competitor to other major
U.S.-London carriers, particularly American Airlines and British Airways.25
In the mid-1990s, partly in response to competition from Virgin, British Air-
ways introduced a series of "Incentive Agreements" targeted at travel agents
and corporate buyers.26 Although some of the incentives were based on vol-
ume (how much revenue a travel agent pushed in BA's direction), others were
based on market share-BA's percentage share of the U.S.-UK flights booked
by the agent.27 The discounts were typically "first dollar," meaning that when
a customer reached the target threshold, it received a discounted price on ear-
lier purchases.28 Virgin brought suit, alleging that the incentive agreements,
along with BA's ability to prevent Virgin from obtaining necessary slots at
London's Heathrow airport, were part of an anticompetitive scheme to slow
Virgin's growth as a competitor.2 9
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted sum-
mary judgment for BA,3 0 and the U.S Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed.31 The Second Circuit first found that Virgin's Sherman Act Section
1 claims failed because Virgin failed to show "actual adverse effects" on con-
sumer welfare.3 2 It then affirmed the dismissal of Virgin's attempted monopo-
lization claim on the grounds that Virgin failed to show that the incentive
agreements resulted in BA pricing airline tickets below cost-a requirement
for predatory pricing claims.33 Reflecting a long line of precedents granting
even dominant firms latitude on unilateral price cuts, the court observed that
24 A brief discussion of the treatment of loyalty discounts or rebates outside the United States
and European Union can be found in EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST
LAW AND EcoNoMics 693-94 (2d ed. 2011).
25 Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256, 260 (2d Cir. 2001).
26 Id. at 261-62.
27 Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d 571, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
("Some of the targets are market-share targets (i.e., targets based on British Airways' percentage
share of the corporation's U.S.-U.K. flights) . . . . Others are total-revenue targets.").
28 British Airways, 257 F.3d at 261.
2 9 Id. at 259.
30 British Airways, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 582.
s' British Airways, 257 F.3d at 273.
32 Id. at 264-65.
3 Id. at 265-69.
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"[t]hese kinds of agreements allow firms to reward their most loyal customers.
Rewarding customer loyalty promotes competition on the merits."3 4
The European Commission,3 5 the General Court,3 6 and European Court of
Justice (ECJ)3 7 reached a very different conclusion on the same facts. In Brit-
ish Airways, the ECJ found that the incentives were prima facie anticompeti-
tive because they had the effect of inducing loyalty to a dominant firm.3 8 The
Court did not cite evidence of actual anticompetitive effects in the sense of
higher consumer prices or diminished output, finding that evidence of actual
anticompetitive effects was unnecessary.3 9 Rather, in keeping with ECJ prece-
dents, it focused on the generic exclusionary potential of loyalty rebates when
exercised by dominant undertakings.4 0
Having found the incentive rebates to be suspect fidelity-building devices,
the Court then considered whether BA had offered an "objective economic
justification" sufficient to overcome the prima facie presumption of illegal-
ity.4 1 BA argued that the rebates were objectively justified because they
helped BA fill empty airplane seats and hence contribute toward its high fixed
operational costs.4 2 The ECJ affirmed the General Court's rejection of this
argument, essentially finding that only direct cost savings from the loyalty
program were the kinds of objective economic justifications sufficient to over-
come the presumption of illegality for the deployment of fidelity discounts by
dominant firms.43
The Intel case followed on the heels of Virgin. The computer central
processing unit (CPU) market has been essentially a duopoly since the 1990s,
with Intel controlling roughly 80 percent and Advanced Micro Devices
(AMD) controlling the other 15 to 20 percent.44 In the late 1990s, Intel began
to offer Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) financial incentives to
purchase specified levels of their CPU requirements-typically around 80 or
34 Id. at 265.
31 Case IV/D-2/34.780-Virgin/British Airways, Comm'n Decision, 2000 O.J. L (30) 1.
36 Case T-219/99, British Airways plc v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-5917.
37 Case C-95/04 P, British Airways plc v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331.
38 Id. ¶ 77 (affirming General Court's finding that "the bonus schemes at issue had a fidelity-
building effect capable of producing an exclusionary effect").
39 Id. 1 30 ("[I]t [was] not necessary to demonstrate that the abuse in question had a concrete
effect on the markets concerned.").
40 Id.
41 Id. ¶ 69.
42 Id. 1 27.
43 Id. ¶ 98.
44 See Daniel A. Crane & Graciella Miralles, Toward a Unified Theory ofExclusionary Verti-




85 percent-from Intel.45 AMD complained that hese loyalty rebates slowed
its market share growth and starved it of the capital needed to invest in devel-
oping new products.4 6 From the early 2000s and continuing to some degree
until the present, AMD and Intel waged a global antitrust war over the legal
treatment of Intel's loyalty discounts. To summarize the headlines briefly,
AMD secured early decisions against Intel in Japan and Korea, a favorable
decision and C1.06 billion (almost $1.5 billion) fine against Intel from the
European Commission, a $1.25 billion settlement payment from Intel, and a
complaint from the Federal Trade Commission that Intel quickly settled.47
Although we have not yet heard the final word from Europe,48 the Intel case
seems to suggest some provisional and fragile rapprochement between the
U.S. and EU treatment of loyalty discounts-at least at the level of public
enforcement. For its part, the European Commission seemed to back away
from the view expressed in Hoffmann-La Roche, Michelin, and BA that loy-
alty discounts by dominant firms should be treated as prima facie illegal and
only permitted if the dominant firm can overcome the high hurdle of proving
marginal cost efficiencies. The key turn came in its December 2008 Guidance
Paper on application of Article 102's prohibition on abuse of dominance. In
its Prohibition Decision, the Commission began by invoking the "form-based"
precedents (Hoffmann-La Roche, Michelin, and BA), but then conducted an
"effects-based" modified predation analysis to conclude that Intel's loyalty
rebates had an exclusionary effect on AMD, and hence on competition.49
A few months after the Commission decision, the FTC brought its own
action against Intel.50 If the Europeans had moved a few yards in the Ameri-
can direction, the Americans moved a few feet in the European direction.
Consistent with U.S. predatory pricing precedent, the Commission alleged
that Intel's rebates would have forced an equally efficient competitor to price
below cost in order to compete.5 1
However, the Commission also gave notice that it intended to push the
boundaries of traditional, pro-defendant predatory pricing law as applied to
loyalty discounts. First, the Commission's complaint alleged that the measure
of cost below which Intel priced included "average variable cost plus an ap-
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 648.
48 As of this writing, the General Court has issued its decision affirming the Commission's
finding of liability, and an appeal to the ECJ is still possible. See Case T-286/09, Intel v.
Comm'n, ECLI:EU:T:2014:547 (GC June 12, 2014).
49 See Crane & Miralles, supra note 44, at 648-49 (describing Commission's approach).
5o Complaint, Intel, FTC Docket No. 9341 (Dec. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Intel Administrative
Complaint], www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf.
51 Id. ¶ 53.
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propriate level of contribution towards sunk costs."5 2 Since most U.S. courts
consider only variable or marginal costs in predatory pricing cases,5 3 this was
a direct challenge to the application of a predatory pricing model in bundled
discount cases.54 Second, the complaint alleged that, while the Commission
was prepared to show that Intel was able to recoup its costs of giving loyalty
discounts through supracompetitive pricing, recoupment should not be a
mandatory element of an FTC case challenging loyalty discounts. Since re-
coupment is an element of a predatory pricing case,56 this statement also sig-
naled the FTC's intention to move away from restrictive predation rules and
analogies toward a more interventionist approach toward loyalty discounts. It
is impossible to know whether these theories would ultimately have held up
had the Intel case been litigated because Intel settled with the Commission a
few months later.7
Most recently, the General Court affirmed the European Commission's de-
cision on the formalistic reasoning of Hoffmann-La Roche, Michelin, and
BA.58 The Court held that the Commission was not required to show that the
rebates in question actually foreclosed competition and rejected the applica-
bility of "as efficient competitor" and "price-cost" tests.5 9 The Court also held
that the economic approach staked out in the 2008 Guidance Paper was not
relevant to the Court's legal analysis, since the Guidance Paper was issued
after the events challenged by the Commission in Intel.60 Although some com-
mentators have understood the General Court's decision as a throw-back to
the formalistic dogma of pre-2008 judicial decisions, the Court's opinion did
not reject the application of economic analysis under the Guidance Paper in
future cases, leaving open the possibility that such analysis becomes the
framework for decision down the road.
52 Id.
53 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW §§ 739-40 (4th ed. 2015)
(explaining application of average variable cost test).
54 See Daniel A. Crane, Predation Analysis and the FTC's Case Against Intel (Univ. of Mich.
Law & Econ. Empirical Legal Stud. Ctr., Working Paper No. 10-014, 2010) (examining ways in
which FTC's proposed cost definition faced difficulties given prevailing legal standards).
55 Intel Administrative Complaint, supra note 50, ¶ 53.
56 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993) ("The
second prerequisite to holding a competitor liable under the antitrust laws for charging low prices
is a demonstration that the competitor had a reasonable prospect, or, under § 2 of the Sherman
Act, a dangerous probability, of recouping its investment in below-cost prices.").
57 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Approves Modified Intel Settlement Order (Nov.
2, 2010), www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/11/intel.shtm.
38 Case T-286/09, Intel v. Comm'n, ECLI:EU:T:2014:547 (GC June 12, 2014).




III. FORMALISMS AND FUNCTIONALISMS IN
LOYALTY REBATE ANALYSIS
A. FORMALISM Is DEAD. LONG LIVE FORMALISM!
At one level, it is easy to tell a story of recent convergence between U.S.
and EU rebate analysis. In this story, Hoffmann-La Roche, Michelin, and BA
represent an older EU formalism that no longer made sense in light of evolv-
ing economic understanding and demands for the harmonization of abuse of
dominance principles in a world of interdependent global antitrust enforce-
ment. Intel and the Guidance Paper (with the caveats discussed with respect to
the General Court decision) mark a turning point, away from formalism and
toward a U.S.-style rule of reason functionalism. And the FTC returned the
favor by relaxing some of the bright-line rules (such as the inclusion of only
short-run incremental costs in the price-cost calculation) and thus converging
toward Europe.
This story, however, overstates both e level of convergence and the level
of economic functionalism prevailing on either side of the Atlantic. In a vari-
ety of ways, whether loyalty rebates will be treated with sympathy or hostility,
and whether they will be subject to prohibitory or immunizing bright-line
rules or open-ended rule of reason analysis remains very much contested in
both the United States and the European Union.
In Europe, neither the European Commission, nor the General Court, nor
the ECJ has abandoned the form-based approach to loyalty rebates reflected in
Hoffmann-LaRoche and Michelin. In Intel, the Commission performed a com-
prehensive legal analysis under the older precedents, finding that since Intel's
discounts amounted to fidelity rebates that restricted customer freedom, they
were illegal under EC precedent.61 Only after finding liability under the form-
based approach did the Commission turn to an equally efficient competitor
analysis, which seems superfluous if liability could be found solely based on
the facts that Intel was dominant and used rebates to induce loyalty. Thus far,
the effects-based approach suggested by the Guidance Paper seems to be used
merely to confirm the economic rationality of a prohibition decision based on
the form-based precedents. What would happen in a case where the form- and
effects-based analyses reached different results is unclear.
The situation in the United States is also quite uncertain, with a wide range
of outcomes possible in any particular case given the Supreme Court's refusal
61 Case COMP/C-3/37.990-Intel, Comm'n Decision ¶ 1001, ec.europa.eulcompetition/anti
trust/cases/dec docs/37990/37990 358118.pdf ("The rebates and payments in question consti-
tute fidelity rebates which fulfil the conditions of the relevant case law for qualification as abu-
sive. . . . In addition, they had the effect of restricting the freedom to choose of the respective
OEMs and of MSH.").
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to consider a loyalty rebate case thus far. It is far from a given that the U.S.
courts would follow the FTC's position in Intel. One of the leading court of
appeals precedents seems to hold that loyalty rebates are not illegal unless
they result in below-cost pricing, without any consideration of performing the
price-cost test after the allocation of discounts to the contestable segment of
the market.6 2 Others seem to suggest that price-cost tests should not be used at
all if the loss of the rebate is used to penalize disloyalty rather than to reward
loyalty 63 (a distinction that is mysterious at best).t No court has yet squarely
embraced the discount attribution test in the loyalty rebate context.65 In the
meantime, loyalty rebates continue to be sharply contested in private litiga-
tion, with varying results in the courts of appeal.6 6 Thus, aspects of formalism
may continue to characterize analysis of loyalty rebates on both sides of the
Atlantic, although in opposite directions. Europe may preserve the Hoffmann-
La RochelMichelin line of legal formalism, in which any rebate that induces
loyalty to a dominant undertaking is deemed prima facie illegal. The United
States, in the meanwhile, may decide in favor of economic formalism, adopt-
ing some version of the price-cost test with marginal cost as the appropriate
measure of cost as an absolute safe-harbor against liability. In that event,
trans-Atlantic comparisons will continue to resemble the divisions reflected in
BA rather than the rapprochement reflected in Intel.
B. FORMALISM Is NOT AN EPITHET
I began this essay by observing that, to most American lawyers at least,
formalism is an epithet describing a cramped, crude form of legal reasoning.
This is not, however, my own view.67 Competition law does not inherently
need to be governed by open-ended rule of reason analysis and economic
functionalism. There remains a need for clear rules of demarcation, both cre-
62 Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008).
63 Daniel A. Crane, Bargaining over Loyalty, 92 TEx. L. REv. 253, 278 n.147 (2014) (collect-
ing sources making the "disloyalty penalty" claim).
64 See id. at 278-84 (critiquing penalty theory).
65 Two recent decisions have addressed the relationship between the price-cost test and loyalty
discounts. In ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012), a federal court of
appeals upheld a jury verdict finding the defendant liable for monopolization based in part on its
use of market share rebates. The court rejected the defendant's argument that it could not be
liable since it did not price below cost, holding that price was not the "clearly predominant
mechanism of exclusion" and therefore that the price-cost test should not apply. Id. at 269.
Conversely, in Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, No. CIV.A. 08-4168 MLC, 2014 WL
1343254, at *26 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2014), aff'd, 821 F.3d 394 (3d Cir. 2016), the district court
held that since price was the alleged principal mechanism of exclusion, the price-cost test applied
to the defendant's market share rebates.
66 See cases cited supra note 65.
67 See generally Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 49 (2007) (arguing that, under some circumstances, rules are preferable to stan-
dards in antitrust analysis).
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ating liability and insulating against it, as to various aspects of antitrust
analysis.
Indeed, it would be nafve to expect that either European or U.S. competi-
tion law will inevitably progress toward an unstructured effects-based analysis
that eschews any use of strong legal or economic presumptions or rules. Legal
historians and scholars of jurisprudence point out that every legal system vac-
illates over time between hard-edged rules and open-ended standards.68 Often,
a legal system will create new formal rules governing some issues even as it
trends toward a more flexible approach to other issues. It is only a slight
exaggeration to say that for every action toward functionalist standards, there
is an equal and opposite reaction toward formal rules. This is arguably the
correct understanding of U.S. antitrust history since the rise of the Chicago
School in the 1970s. Prohibitory rules have relaxed in favor of prohibitory
standards even while immunizing standards have morphed into immunizing
rules.
In part, the choice between rules and standards as to loyalty rebates turns on
background ideological assumptions about the role and limits of dominant
firms in market-oriented economies. The Hoffmann-La Roche/Michelin ap-
proach imagines dominant firms as aberrations with special responsibilities to
avoiding perpetuating dominance and to avoid distortions of the competitive
playing field. The most immunizing versions of the price/cost test imagine
dominant firms as beneficial actors deserving of protection against antitrust
challenges except in extreme cases of objectively predatory behavior. Differ-
ing Bayesian prior beliefs about dominance and the role of competition law in
achieving a level playing field explain many of the differences.
But the choice between formal rules and flexible standards is only partly a
question of background assumptions about dominance or ideology more gen-
erally. It also involves an expression of views about the dynamics of agency
or court decision making and other institutional factors such as the role of
private litigation and damages. Two people with common background beliefs
about loyalty rebates may come out differently on the appropriate analytical
mode because of different perspectives on institutional questions. For exam-
ple, former FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright-who is quite sympathetic to
dominant firms and loyalty rebates in most circumstances-has come out
68 For example, the philosopher Morris Cohen argued that "periodic waves of reform during
which the sense of justice, natural law, or equity introduces life and flexibility into the law and
makes it adjustable to its work" are often followed by periods where "under the social demand
for certainty, equity gets hardened and reduced to rigid rules." MORRIs R. COHEN, LAW AND THE
SOCIAL ORDER 261 (1933). Similarly, property law scholar Carol Rose has documented a ten-
dency in property law to "shift back and forth between hard-edged, yes-or-no crystalline rules
and discretion-laden, post hoc muddy rules." Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law,
40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 590 (1988).
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against the application of any version of the price-cost test.69 Wright has long
advocated in favor of "evidence-based" antitrust analysis, which means di-
minished reliance on a priori conceptions or formal rules but instead a fact-
intensive exploration of the circumstances of each case. I share many of
Wright's sympathies, but have advocated in favor of the discount attribution
approach in large part because of concerns that open-ended rule of reason
analysis makes it less likely that courts will dismiss meritless complaints at
the pretrial stage or otherwise cabin the jury's discretion to punish loyalty
programs for reasons other than a reduction in market competition. I support a
price-cost safe harbor not because loyalty programs within the safe harbor are
in every case incapable of harming competition, but because, given the rele-
vant institutions, the error costs of scrutinizing those cases are high.
Debates of these kinds are unlikely to disappear. On both sides of the At-
lantic, elements of formalism and functionalism will continue to characterize
antitrust analysis of loyalty rebates, even though they may appear in different
places at different times.
IV. CONCLUSION
Many American antitrust practitioners welcomed Europe's ostensible shift
from form-based to effects-based analysis as a step in a westward direction.
But even as contestation over this potential shift continues in Europe, the
United States continues its own contestation over the extent to which antitrust
analysis should rely on formal rules or more open-ended standards. The major
difference is that the existing European rules create liability in a large swath
of cases whereas some U.S. rules would prevent it in an equally large swath.
The stakes on both sides of the Atlantic are not just over whether formal or
functional liability determinants should be employed, but whether loyalty re-
bates should be received with sympathy or hostility.
69 Joshua D. Wright, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at Bates White 10th Annual
Antitrust Conference: Simple but Wrong or Complex but More Accurate? The Case for an Ex-
clusive Dealing-Based Approach to Evaluating Loyalty Discounts (June 3, 2013), www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/public-statements/simple-wrong-or-complex-more-accurate-case-
exclusive-dealing-based-approach-evaluating-loyalty/130603bateswhite.pdf.
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